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L’HISTOIRE DANS LE DÉBAT PUBLICS : 1
SOME MILITARY-HISTORICAL REFLECTIONS 
ON AFGHANISTAN
By Desmond Morton
For the past year, Canadians have been waking up about once a week on average
to learn that a fellow Canadian, perhaps even three or four of us, have been
killed or terribly mangled somewhere in Afghanistan. Early on September 18, as 
I set out to try to explain all this to the Canadian Women’s Club of Montreal 
why this was happening, we learned that four more had been killed by an elderly
suicide bomber on a bicycle. So why are we in Afghanistan? Or, to get closer to
the nub, why are Canadian soldiers killing and being killed in a dusty, impover-
ished corner of the world almost none of us have ever seen?
Let me confess right away. I would just as soon not see the Canadian Forces in
Afghanistan. That is NOT because our soldiers are dying or, worse in some minds,
are killing others. As professionals, they would do the same, if they were sent 
to Darfur, or if UNIFIL had really been designed to demilitarize southern 
Lebanon and not simply to encourage the Israelis to leave. What I hate about 
our Afghanistan commitment is its history and our dependence on our allies.
What I hate even more is the echo of schoolyard bullying rant from our current
government. What I would hate even more is complicity in the fate of Afghans
who trusted us.
Perhaps most of us absorbed a myth that Canadian peacekeeping was non-
violent? It usually was in the Cold War, once the super-powers had decided to
shut down their clients. What Canadians accomplished in the Middle East, central
America and Indochina was well worth doing but, as Sean Mahoney has made
clear, Canada served its super-power neighbour as loyally as Polish peacekeepers
served Moscow, and who should be ashamed of that? As a vast, underpopulated
country in a dangerous world, Canada has had a lifetime commitment to having
and serving our allies, be they France, Britain or the United States. If we ever
really wanted to know, our peacemakers might have shared some awful stories.
Here’s one that made it into print. In Peacemaker, Major General Lewis Mackenzie
recalled being a young officer in the Gaza Strip. One day, he asked some Gurkha
officers in a neighbouring Indian Army unit how they controlled pilferage. They
invited him to stop over until nightfall to see. 
At dusk, he saw a smart, well-armed sentry march down his beat, stamp out his
about-turn and march back. All was quiet. A grey shape whisked up to the patrol
line, paused, listened, and scuttled across. Like the intruder, Lew hadn’t noticed
another Gurkha, padding softly behind the sentry. His kukri slashed down. The
intruder sagged. A chop at the neck, and the intruder’s head was hurled out into
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Bulletin
C a n a d i a n  H i s t o r i c a l  A s s o c i a t i o n  •  S o c i é t é  h i s t o r i q u e  d u  C a n a d a
4
the desert darkness. His friends would find it at dawn.
Indians troops, of course, were the world’s ideal as
Ghandian-style peacekeepers. 
Like Indians and Pakistanis, I don't much like Afghanistan.
Its history makes it a place do-gooders should avoid.
Engraved on my childhood memory is an illustration from 
a book called British Battles on Land and Sea. Most of the
battles, as you might imagine, were British victories, but 
in the middle of the book was an exception, illustrated by 
a lonely figure slumped on a donkey and entitled: “Dr.
Bryden’s Return to Jellalabad”. The text reminded me that
Bryden was a British army surgeon and sole survivor of the
army of 19,000 British and Indian soldiers, plus wives, chil-
dren, servants and camp followers that Lord Elphinstone had
led up the Khyber Pass in 1839 to overthrow a wicked Afghan
tyrant and to bring the blessings of good government under
their man, Dost Mohammed, to a much-oppressed people. Dr.
Bryden had been spared the imprisonment, torture and death
of thousands of British and Indian men, women and children
and their Afghan allies, to bring word of the outcome.
Of course the Raj did not accept that verdict. A fresh army
was launched into Afghanistan, more tribesmen — and
women — were duly slaughtered, but this time, like George
Bush the Elder after the First Gulf War, the British did not
stay. Certainly they returned at intervals until 1922. In the
process, they learned a lot about mountain warfare. but they
also learned not to stay. Dr. Bryden’s image shaped my 
misgivings about our Afghan future.
In 1994, McGill's dean of arts, John McCallum hired me 
away from the University of Toronto. Later, he served in 
the Chrétien government as defence minister, and his duties
took him to Kabul. It was, he assured me later, a miserable
place, oppressively hot by noon; frigidly cold at night. Day
and night, the air was full of tiny dust particles whipped
incessantly by the mountain winds. He felt constantly filthy. 
Afghanistan is also desperately poor. Only one crop flourishes,
as it does in other desperately poor economies: poppies, a
raw material for the drug trade. Canadians may associate the
poppy with Flanders’ Fields; Afghan farmers know it is their
only cash crop. Dried and easily processed, it provides
Afghans and their warlords with a billion-dollar share of the
heroin trade. The market is in America and Europe. Heroin
addiction is a devastating affliction, and who would want 
to encourage it? The quiet truth is that we do. When
Afghanistan’s Taliban rulers, as strict Moslems, tried to 
wipe out the narcotics trade, the Warlords opportunely
joined the Northern Alliance, and backed “our guy”, Hamid
Karzai. When foreign invaders began burning the poppy
fields, some Warlords quietly shifted back to the “the other
guys”. What would you honestly expect?
How do you win a guerilla war? You win the hearts and
minds of the people. When the foreigners who promised
democracy, elections and equality for women deliver starva-
tion for the poor and hard times for the wealthy, a few
schools, clinics and orphanages are meagre compensation.
Currently, I am told, NATO has allegedly had the sense to
quietly put the brakes on the war on poppy fields. It is
hardly a joyful or easily publicised compromise.
So why, in the face of all that, are we there? For a start,
unlike Iraq, the U.N. approved. As devout multilateralists, 
this made a huge difference to Canada. Having shared in the
initial defeat of the Taliban by U.S. Special Forces and a few
of our own Joint Task Force (JTF), the U.N. invited NATO to
provide security for constitution-making leading to general
elections. Once that process had produced Hamid Karzai's
government, NATO continued to provide security in the 
capital, Kabul, and through civil-military “Provincial
Reconstruction Teams” (PRTs) in the regions. Canada 
signed on to provide a reinforced infantry battalion in Kabul.
While PRTs seemed to work, establishing them in Taliban
strongholds in southern Afghanistan proved a lot harder.
Without them, reconstruction was stalled. As NATO comman-
der of ISAF, General Rick Hillier shared this brutal reality with
Ottawa. Finally, the Liberal government stepped up while
most other NATO members fumbled with alibis ranging from
George Bush to inadequate training. The result was our com-
mitment to Kandahar while the British took on the adjoining
and equally dangerous Helmand province.
How long will Canadians be there? Official deadlines aside,
the real answer is that we will be there until an Afghan
army and police force can replace NATO forces. How long is
that? Don't hold your breath. Currently, the toughest, most
dangerous soldiering and police work in the world is being
tackled by men with fourteen day's training and a salary of
about $10 a week. You get what you pay for. 
...continued from page 1
Canadian soldiers incorporated with US soldiers into the same patrol in
Afghanistan. Source: Department of National Defence, Combat Camera,
AR2006-P008 0019
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In any guerilla war, you must isolate insurgents from their
sources of supply and reinforcements. Afghanistan defeated
the Soviet Army because the U.S. persuaded Pakistan to 
funnel weapons, explosives and talibs or religious students
across the Waziristan border. Now the U.S. and NATO are 
the targets. So why not overthrow General Pervez Musharref,
and treat his country like Iraq. Remember that, unlike Iraq or
Iran, Pakistan really has about fifty nuclear warheads and
some fanatics obviously eager to use them. Next question? 
Historians look for patterns in the past. Afghanistan's internal
conflicts have always made it easy to conquer. The problem,
whether for the Russians, the British, the Persians or
Alexander the Great, was gaining anything from the conquest.
For the Soviet Union, defeat in Afghanistan dissolved its
empire and ended the Cold War. Afghans gained nothing but
a cruel regime of religious fanatics which provoked its own
downfall but not its legitimate replacement. It remains to be
seen if the Karzai regime, with all its incredible challenges
and meagre material support, can eventually develop its own
legitimacy behind the helicopters, armoured vehicles and
machine guns of a reluctant NATO. 
Meanwhile, like the British learning the rules of mountain
warfare, Canadians are testing tactics borrowed from their
American mentors. In the wake of the Cold War, U.S. generals
recognized that they would no longer fight armies similar to
their own but enemies “asymmetric” in every way. Instead of
the “bear”, as they described the huge, mechanized Soviet
Army, they would be fighting “snakes”, ill-armed, uncoordi-
nated, but deadly enemies, fuelled by idealism and rage. One
answer was a “Revolution in Military Affairs”, or RMA, linking
command, control, communications and intelligence in the
same computer. Enthusiasts spoke of “net-centric warfare”.
They boasted that they could locate Ossama bin Laden even
under a mountain, and blast him to atoms with a “bunker
buster” launched from a UAV — an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.
Never again would enemy commanders have secrets. 
Did it work? Wasn't the collapse of the Taliban an answer? Yes
and no. RMA sounded more amazing than it was. “Snakes”
proved tougher and much less predictable than well-trained
generals. Ossama, as I write, still lives, an inspiration to any-
one in the world with a bad hate for imperial arrogance. RMA
has been overshadowed by a new doctrine, the so-called
“three block war”. Recognizing that future wars will take
place in cities and in densely populated third-world countries,
General Charles Kruhlak, head of the United States Marine
Corps, foresaw full-scale combat in one block, coinciding with
rescuing the devastated survivors in the next block, and win-
ning hearts in the third block. All would be accomplished by
the same sweaty soldiers.
In combat, soldiers shoot first and ask questions later.
Those who forget get killed, or so badly wounded they 
wish they had been. Changing from killer to social worker 
in minutes is a stretch. Can soldiers be trained, equipped
and commanded to do it? Daily in Iraq, Americans try 
to learn how. We and they have an awful lot to learn.
Currently, that's what Canadians learn in Edmonton,
Petawawa and Valcartier before their next six-month 
stint in Kandahar. 
Why do Canadians embrace American military doctrine? Back
in 1948, Ottawa formally decided to abandon the British
doctrines and equipment we had adopted in 1908 and clung
to during two world wars. Fed up with inferior equipment
and an enfeebled postwar Britain, we embraced our newly-
powerful neighbour. This little-noticed but crucial transfor-
mation now defines our Navy, our Air Force and, a little
more reluctantly, our Army. Remember the green uniforms 
of Armed Forces Unification? Blamed on Paul Hellyer, they
were devised by General Jean-Victor Allard, modelled on 
U.S. air force dress uniforms, and purged the new Canadian
Forces of most of their “British” look. Of course we are
unique. Americans give their generals little silver stars; 
we issue them little gold maple leaves.
As they once headed to Camberley or the Imperial Defence
College, Canadian colonels, admirals and sergeant-majors
head south for advanced military education. We strive to 
be "interoperable" throughout NATO and NORAD but the
Americans set the standard in weapons, equipment and,
therefore, doctrine. Our burly and outspoken Chief of
Defence Staff, General Rick Hillier, polished his military
expertise as deputy commander of a U.S. army corps at 
Fort Hood, Texas, before commanding NATO forces in
Afghanistan. His watch-word, “Transformation”, just 
happens to be the slogan Defence Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld imposed on the Pentagon to reshape the American
armed forces to win his administration's “Three-Block War”
against asymmetric opponents in Iraq. 
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Two more Canadian soldiers killed in Afghanistan are carried into a
C-130 Hercules aircraft for repatriation to Canada. 
Source: Department of National Defence, Combat Camera, 
AR2006-G017-0010
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On the whole, Canadian troops have cheerfully embraced their
Americanization. All armed forces want to match up to the
current leaders in their trade. Equally obviously their fellow
Canadians give less priority than Americans to issues of
national security. “Canada's military problem”, declared
R.M.C.'s Joel Sokolsky in May, 2001, “is that we have no 
military problem”. That happy claim was undermined on 9/11
or, more precisely on 9/12 when, in response to the previous
day's events, the United States slammed its border shut,
potentially eliminating 80 per cent of our exports and 42 per
cent of our Gross National Product. That reminder of our deep
dependence on our neighbour was a powerful incentive to
Ottawa to enhance American security in every feasible way
we could, from buying more X-ray machines for airports to
doubling our Joint Task Force (of which most Canadians had
never heard). Promptly fulfilling alliance commitments under
the U.N. and NATO was an obvious added step.
At the same time, very few Canadians outside the military
community wanted to match the billions that Congress has
lavished on modernizing U.S. forces at the expense of a 
ballooning deficit and a strange dependence on China as 
its dominant creditor. Last June, with a new Conservative
government in office. Canadians saw how quickly Stephen
Harper could run through C$17 billion to buy a few ships, 
aircraft and vehicles, without even a reference to our obso-
lete tanks, artillery, destroyers or the $3.5 billion Lockheed
F-35s needed to replace the air force's twenty-five year-old
CF-18 Hornets as guardians of our skies. Defence is expensive. 
If our Canadian Forces seldom complained out loud about their
worn-out and faulty equipment, it is chiefly because they are
disciplined professionals, responsive to a long tradition of civil
supremacy. Most are recruited from a shrinking sub-set of
Canadians from small towns and rural regions, where life offers
few easy rewards. Their pride comes from succeeding in active
and dangerous service, especially in the sight of their allies.
Despite the losses and the danger, serving in the heat, dirt
and danger of Afghanistan is more satisfying than playing
make-believe war with obsolete gear at Petawawa, Valcartier,
or Wainwright. Dutiful to their calling, journalists will be tire-
less in challenging this boring truth but most soldiers know
what to expect by the time the harsh rituals of their training
are complete. Disciplined, submissive armed forces are sadly
rare beyond the First World. One of the realities of countries
afflicted by poverty and civil war is civilian populations men-
aced by corrupt or fanatical militias, submissive only to those
who pay them, like the condottiere of mediaeval Italy.
Canadian peacekeepers have met them in Bosnia, Kossovo and
Kandahar, and they lie in wait for us in Darfur or Lebanon or
Shri Lanka. 
Back in Canada, Afghanistan could easily be the most unpop-
ular commitment the Conservatives have inherited from the
Liberals. Ujal Dosanjh, the Liberal defence critic, claimed last
summer that the Tories had changed the rules and declared
war, not peace in Afghanistan. Dosanjh's leader, Bill Graham,
had made the commitment as defence minister and repudiated
Dosanjh. One wonders whether the next Liberal leader will
feel similarly bound. 
Could Stephen Harper change his mind to become more popu-
lar with voters. Should he, as many have urged, abandon
Afghanistan and redeploy our troops to Lebanon or Darfur?
Odder things have happened. NDP leader Jack Layton urges
Canada to save our troops, cut our losses, and abandon the
awful contradictions of any Afghan enterprise. What happens
to the people who trust in our protection and help? History
suggests that they will eventually be abandoned. If any 
successor regime makes it utterly unsafe for western 
journalists to report, as happened in Vietnam after 1975, 
few in the West will know or mourn their fate.
After abandoning Afghanistan, could we then bring peace to
Lebanon or Darfur? With a few thousand discredited Canadian
troops, could the United Nations make UNIFIL powerful
enough to do what Lebanon obviously will not do: disarm the
Hezbollah? Would Canadians fight and die to force a largely
Shiite region to repudiate its defenders? Israel lost more
troops than it could stomach when its defence forces tried
last summer. 
Like Lebanon and Afghanistan, Darfur is very much a heritage
of 19th Century imperialism. Can Canadian troops stop rape
and murder by the dreadful Janjaweed without bloodshed?
Have we really chosen sides in a civil war for a secessionist
Sudanese province? Or could we stand guard selectively,
repelling only rapists and murderers while the civil war goes
on around us? It seems improbable, and perhaps even more
improbable if we have just ducked out of commitments made
with adequate but imperfect knowledge of the consequences.
Most Canadians tell pollsters that they would like our troops
to be popular peacekeepers. Is that possible if there is no
peace to keep? In our earlier “peacekeeping” experiences, the
fighting had effectively ended before most of the blue berets
arrived, and powerful interests wanted peace kept. That was
not the case in 1991 when Canadians deployed to the former
Yugoslavia, and it is decidedly not the case in Afghanistan,
Lebanon, Darfur or Shri Lanka. Imposing peace before both
parties to a struggle are exhausted, as any police officer
knows, usually involves further force. Proving, even against
historical experience and the current odds, that Afghanistan
can be stabilized and rendered prosperous, would be an
amazing triumph well worth achieving. Could it happen?
“Only God knows what's going to happen”, I once told a
Senate committee, “and She isn't telling.”
Desmond Morton retired last May (2006) as Hiram Mills 
Professor f History at McGill University. He is currently 
up-dating his Military History of Canada.
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